

Robert Brandom's reading of Hegel is clarifying for assessing the importance and meaning of Hegel's view in the perspective of contemporary analytical philosophy. In what follows, I focus on one aspect of Brandom's view that needs to be made more explicit (or maybe slightly changed), namely Hegel's concept of truth, in particular the typically Hegelian connection between truth and contradiction. In 2005, Brandom claims that truth, "Hegelianly" intended, is (rightly, in my view) the whole process through which we inferentially determine the content of concepts, and transform judgements. However, this seems to imply that Hegelian truth is not a property of single judgements/propositions. I stress, in contrast, that truth is, in Hegel's view, both the process through which we inferentially determine the content of concepts, *and* a predicate (or predicative function) we use to express the property of propositions, claims, statements, assertions, or any other truth-bearer.

This allows to anchor Hegel's philosophy more solidly to the analytic tradition, and more specifically to logic, showing, in particular, the link between Hegel's dialectic and glutty approaches to truth.